In War In Ukraine Everyone Loses Poland Is No Exception ANALYSIS
"Asking who gained from a war is like asking who gained from the famous 1906 San Francisco earthquake " — wrote in the late 1950s Kenneth Waltz, one of the fathers of modern political realism, emphasizing that "there are no winners in wars, only varying degrees of defeat.
" This is a rather obvious statement And not only because war is an extremely destructive and demoralizing occupation.
But also because in the course of war, threats and dangers are usually revealed that leaders do not think about at the beginning of the conflict, or deliberately ignore them in the hope of a quick victory These threats and dangers are quickly beginning to influence the interests that individual states go to war with, and the unfortunate consequence of this state of affairs is that conflicts are prolonged and the parties involved make maximalist – and thus unrealistic – demands.
Therefore, in May last year, the following thesis could be put forward: "Although President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Western countries promise to fight until victory over Russia, there are no winners in this war Everyone loses and no one will achieve the goals that may have seemed so tangible to the threshold of war.
" That is why after a year of war nothing has changed in this respect The rest of the text is below the video.
A year ago, Russia illegally invaded Ukraine because it felt it could not achieve its political goals in Europe by other means These were: Ukraine's neutrality and its rejection of the path leading to NATO, Kyiv's recognition of Crimea as Russian territory, and autonomy or independence for Donetsk and Lugansk.
In a broader perspective, Moscow wanted Western states to take into account its views on the principles of sovereignty, freedom and security in Europe In the Kremlin's view, achieving these goals would allow it to influence Ukrainian policy and gain a buffer which, even if it were not hostile towards the West, would not have the ambition to break with Russia.
Thus, Moscow would also signal that it is one of the European powers, and that its interests are inextricably linked with the territory of Europe Contrary to the hopes of the Kremlin, from a military point of view, the invasion of Ukraine turned out to be a failure for the Russian army.
It failed to take Kiev, and quickly had to regroup and withdraw from northern Ukraine, which it had taken at the first stage of the war Yes, Russia has occupied a large part of Ukraine's territory and may increase these gains during the next offensive in the Donbas, but it is hard to expect that this will significantly change the Kremlin's political calculations.
However, the mere fact of invading – and thus speaking out in European affairs by illegal means – brought such great condemnation of Russia in the West, which the Kremlin probably did not expect when starting the war The image of Russian crimes in Ukraine also aroused the reaction of Western societies, which decided that it was impossible to ignore them.
All this puts pressure on Western governments to continue to help Ukraine and not to compromise with Moscow A prolonged war will put a strain on the Russian economy (but not as much as the West expects), moreover, it opens the door to friction between the Russian power elites.
Although the Kremlin is convinced that it is fighting a war to defend its position and privileges as a world power, and so it will not bend as long as it is able to fight for them, it will not achieve its goals in the foreseeable future, it will not gain influence on the political order in Europe and for a long time it will not be treated as a normal state in the West Ukraine - having been a victim of the Russian invasion - is today a country with large areas destroyed and ruined.
Millions of people had to flee from the east and south of the country, large swaths of the front are mined, and rebuilding the country and its economy after the end of the war - whenever it happens - can take years At the beginning of the war, Ukraine declared that its goal is to join Western institutions, primarily NATO and the EU.
The prospect of accession to the EU has come closer only symbolically Brussels is not eager to speed up the accession path for Kiev, because it is aware of how complicated the process is.
Especially since there is still a war going on in Ukraine, and moreover, not all EU countries would be equally willing to see Ukraine in the Community Accession to NATO is also a distant prospect, because neither the US nor European countries intend to cover Ukraine with the guarantees resulting from the first articles of the North Atlantic Treaty - not to mention the famous Art.
5, which deals with mutual assistance in the event of an attack on one of the Alliance's countries The West talked about it not only before the war, but also after it started and nothing has changed in this regard.
Anyway, it is well known that as long as Ukraine's declared goal is to join NATO, it will remain under attack from Russia Of course, it can be rightly argued that the first year of the war contributed to the construction of a modern Ukrainian identity, and in addition created a state in Eastern Europe armed with modern equipment, whose army will be better able to deter the Russian army.
However, this has not brought Ukraine any closer to being institutionally anchored in the West, and such a scenario should not be expected in the foreseeable future Further pursuit of this goal - which Ukrainians have a right to - inevitably entails the same tragic consequences that they have been experiencing for the last year.
The largest Western European countries are also losing Last year, the vision of Europe's strategic autonomy, promoted in various forms by Germany and France, was buried for a long time.
The war in Ukraine made the closer integration of the European Union around the single currency recede into the background, and the attempts to change the decision-making in the EU's foreign policy, timidly raised by Germany, have no clout today European politics is taking place not only in the shadow of the war, but also of the rivalry between the USA and Russia, to which Europe's relations with both powers have been subordinated.
The largest countries of Western Europe wanted to start building another world "pole", but the war in Ukraine showed that they are too weak, to play an equal role with the United States This fact meant that in the last year the Franco-German vision, according to which Russia is a European state and as such should belong to the European political order, was also suppressed, without prejudging the nature of this affiliation.
This vision is not completely dead anyway, because already during the war, German and French politicians openly said that Russia is a European state, and from time to time you can hear from them that you should think about what the post-war world will look like, from which Russia it doesn't magically evaporate Nevertheless, this view is no longer so willingly shared even in Germany and France itself, and moreover, it has completely failed in the clash with the Anglo-Saxon concept, which for Russia as it has been in recent years has no place in Europe.
US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin explicitly stated that the goal of the West is to weaken Russia to such an extent that "it can no longer do what it is doing now in Ukraine", and this statement has become more or less official policy of the entire West Any attempts to nuance this position – precisely on the part of Berlin and Paris – have met with stiff resistance from the Americans for the time being.
After a year of war, Germany and France, despite being the strongest countries in the European Union, have virtually nothing to say on strategic issues for the future of Europe Not necessarily by choice, but because they had to submit to the will of the US.
Just like at the beginning of the war, a working thesis can be put forward that it is not, and in the long run, it will not be a healthy situation for Europe itself, and therefore also for Poland China is also not comfortable with the war started by Russia in February last year.
First of all, because the war in Ukraine showed that their greatest adversary, the United States, is able to rally almost all allies under the banner of the struggle of democratic states against autocracies This arrangement is unfavorable for Beijing, because it basically has no allies and is itself surrounded by countries that are either American allies or at least sympathize with Washington.
In the field of the global clash marked by the Biden administration, i e.
the clash between democracy and autocracies, China's most important partner has been greatly weakened Although the strategic partnership between Russia and China is not as strong as is often assumed, undoubtedly Beijing would still prefer to have a stronger Russia on its side than a Russia weakened by the ongoing war.
Secondly, a valuable lesson for China is the Russian invasion of Ukraine itself It turned out that the war, which was supposed to be very short, has stalled, has been going on for a year, and Russia is losing more resources and experiencing onerous sanctions from the West.
From the perspective of China, which for years has been talking about regaining Taiwan - if necessary, then by force - this is a warning that their own plans for the island may not work out as they assume Today we know that Vladimir Putin underestimated the strength of the Ukrainian resistance, the scale of Western aid and the weaknesses of his own army.
China, which is closely watching the war in Ukraine, should draw one fundamental conclusion: every war brings with it a number of unknowns, and therefore it is safer to strengthen its international position in a more evolutionary way than in a military way Undoubtedly, the term "losers" is least suitable for the United States.
They successfully supported Ukraine, which managed to keep the front line away from Kiev They gathered a coalition of aid for Ukraine under their own banner and pushed through the supply of weapons that no one had ever expected to see in the hands of Ukrainian soldiers.
Nevertheless, there are at least two question marks regarding Washington's policy towards the war in Ukraine Firstly, Washington does not have a fully defined policy towards Russia.
It is known that he intends to act in such a way as to weaken it to such an extent that it cannot attack Ukraine again It is also known - mainly from the statements of Antony Blinken - that the US is ready to help Ukraine restore the borders from before February 24.
But what does this mean in practice? What is the time horizon of these activities? What weapons would the US still need to deliver to Ukraine in order for Kiev to launch a successful counter-offensive and regain lost territories? And what if in such a scenario Russia decided to use tactical nuclear weapons? These questions hang in the air, the Americans do not know the answers to them, and therefore they are trying to increase qualitative support for Ukraine quite carefully Secondly, during the war in Ukraine, the topic of the use of nuclear weapons reappeared in Europe after many years.
From the US point of view, the prospect of breaking the nuclear taboo is a highly unfavorable situation Not only because Russia could use such weapons in Ukraine, but also because that the very discussion on this subject encourages states in Asia and the Middle East, which are now extremely militarized, to make their own stalkers and experiments with nuclear weapons, and in the perspective of a possible conflict, even to use them.
Undoubtedly, the risk of using tactical nuclear weapons is higher than a year ago It doesn't mean it's high, it's just relatively higher.
Paradoxically, the more the Americans achieved their goal of significantly weakening Russia and driving its troops out of Ukrainian territory, the more likely the Kremlin would use tactical nuclear weapons Such a scenario would force the US to be even more involved in Ukraine, which is not supported by the American public today and would have an impact on the rivalry with Washington's biggest rival, i.
E China
Diplomacy, moderation and the art of compromise fell victim to this war as they fall victim to every war The countries that have hitherto facilitated agreements between the great powers and rendered good services – in other words, have oiled the international system by presenting proposals for resolving conflicts, passing messages between interested parties and arranging meetings between them – suffer the most from this.
One such country was Finland, which at the beginning of the war decided to join NATO This is a good example of a country that decided to change the switch of its security policy, thus losing valuable assets that distinguished it from other countries and which served it so well over the years.
The more so that in mid-January, the head of military intelligence of the Finnish armed forces, Juha Vauhkonen, stated that " Despite nice and necessary gestures of solidarity and help to Ukrainian refugees Despite the necessary European solidarity and military and economic support for Ukraine.
Despite the assurances of the Polish authorities that other European countries should follow the example of Polish policy towards Ukraine and Russia Despite the enthusiasm aroused by the symbolism around the US president's visits to Poland.
For Poland, the biggest change that has taken place since February 24 is that we find ourselves less and less between Germany and Russia, and more and more between Germany, Ukraine and Russia Ukraine, yes, suffered a lot and still suffers, but it gained one of the strongest armies in Europe, and moreover, the Americans declare huge post-war support for its economy and society.
In the plans of the USA, and partly also in reality, a large state is being formed in Eastern Europe – a real subject, not an object of international relations – with a considerable military potential The US has invested heavily in the future of Ukraine, and the recent visit of Joe Biden to the Ukrainian capital was a testimony to this new rank of Kiev.
In Poland, it is either not thought of in such terms at all, or one thinks of such a development of the situation with approval Initially, however, it should be assumed that the consequences of such a state of affairs will not be only positive for Poland.
Moreover, as a result of the war, Poland became a real NATO frontline state The war on the eastern flank became a reality, our neighborhood became much less predictable and stable, and the government in Warsaw began to act in a way that as if he had adopted a strategy - irresponsibly prompted by leading Polish geopoliticians - according to which Poland should prepare for an offensive war.
Poland, a medium-sized country with a relatively small military potential, found itself in a situation where military power determines the course of events in its neighbourhood For Poland, this is the worst possible solution and the fact that basically no one is bothered by this situation (and even arouses enthusiasm) is the worst proof of the quality and maturity of the Polish elites.
In the end, Poland is losing out on the weakening of the international position of Europe and the European Union and the disappearance of diplomatic initiatives Strengthening the Community and its political, military, economic and diplomatic potential has been in Warsaw's interest for years.
Meanwhile, little Although the war in Ukraine revealed the weakness of all these aspects of European policy, Poland was not involved in strengthening them in the slightest On the contrary, we are primarily interested in showing Germany a place in the ranks and creating ad hoc coalitions with small states such as Lithuania to prove its commitment to Ukraine.
This approach will backfire on us in other areas of European politics Of course, the war in Ukraine inevitably involves Poland in the eastern part of the continent.
However, it should be borne in mind that putting ourselves in the forefront in every possible aspect of helping Ukraine will also have very important, so to speak, civilizational consequences for us Well, even longer than necessary, which is probably for many years, we will remain a country set in the east of Europe, which has been our greatest curse for centuries.
Meanwhile, from Poland's point of view, the surest way to ensure security was and still is anchoring itself as strongly as possible in the West – in NATO, but above all in the European Union This unfortunate trend of drifting towards the East has returned to Polish politics in recent years for other reasons, but this war only deepens it.
Although we have no influence on the course of the war and the very fact that it is taking place outside our borders, we can shape our own future with our decisions However, the disregard with which we look at the actions of the largest Western European countries in the context of the war in Ukraine, and the longing with which we lean towards the East, does not, however, give hope that that our choices will move us towards the West and those aspects of its political and diplomatic culture that are worth taking an example from.
And it certainly won't happen in the foreseeable future *** Before the war, one could read that a conflict in the East could be beneficial for Poland, because it would confirm the correctness of Polish intuitions about the true nature of the Russian state, and, moreover, would finally ensure a strong presence of American troops in Poland.
Tens of thousands of victims, millions of refugees, a large part of a large country neighboring Poland destroyed, the collapse of stability in our part of Europe, nuclear threats, economic uncertainty, the marginalization of the whole of Europe as a serious political actor, as well as the increasing militarization of international politics should lead to at least a residual reflection , whether a medium-sized country with a moderate military potential - i e.
such as Poland - can really pay off a war in Europe You will find the special edition of "365 Days of War in Ukraine" in good newsagents and on Literia.
pl, as well as in the weekly subscription option You can also read all the texts from the issue thanks to Onet Premium subscription.
.
Post a Comment for "In War In Ukraine Everyone Loses Poland Is No Exception ANALYSIS"